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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN AGGREGATE CORPO-
RATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OTTO BUEHNER & COMPANY, a 
corporation and PAUL BUEHNER, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
D. W. BRIMHALL, 
Additional-Defendant on 
Counterclaim and Cross-Complainant. 
Case No. 
13478 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
OTTO BUEHNER & COMPANY & PAUL BUEHNER 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant has accurately stated the Nature of the 
Case, its disposition and the Nature of Relief Sought. 
However, Appellant's Statement of the Facts omits so 
much that was critical and in fact, dispositive, that we 
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have elected to refer to that evidence in detail. In order 
to avoid tthe confusion sometimes given by a lawyer's 
interpretation of the evidence we have referred frequently 
to that evidence by question and answer. 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF THE PACTS 
The case involves a basically simple fact situation. 
The defendant Brimhall and Appellant American Aggre-
gate Corporation had a joint interest in crushed white 
quartzite which had remained substantially unsold for 
three or four years. Both parties wanted to sell and Re-
spondents wanted to buy. Brimhall signed a purchase 
order agreement (Ex. 19-P in October of 1969). I t pro-
vides for the sale of 4,000 tons plus of this rock (Ex. 19-
P) . The 4,000 plus tons were delivered by Appellant and 
Clark Tank Lines Co. beginning immediately after the 
date of this purchase order. Appellant received, continu-
ing through most of 1970, its portion of the money paid 
Clark Tank Lines for hauing and also received payment 
for its own hauling plus its share of the payment provided 
for in Exhibit 19-P. What was not paid was tendered 
into court. 
The basic dispute arises over price. Appellant claims 
that Brimhall was never authorized to agree to the terms 
in Exhibit 19-P — which provided for $20.50 per ton. It 
claims various larger amounts — from $25.50 to $29.50 
to $35.00 per ton. It does not claim that Respondents 
ever agreed to these larger amounts, but simply that these 
were the only prices Brimhall was authorized to act upon. 
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Appellant also claims that $20.50 per ton was below cost 
and therefore, an illegal sale. 
Respondents claim, and the court so found, that 
Brimhall was not only authorized to act, but that Appel-
lant ratified his acts. 
Appellant, in an apparent effort to convince the court 
that Respondents could not get this material from any 
source other than its quarry, states that "milk-white 
quartz" was specified, and then asserts that the only 
other milk-white quartz was located in Virginia. There 
was hearsay evidence that "Park Valley quartz," not 
"milk-white quartz" was specified. Park Valley is an 
area where white quartz is available in at least two other 
quarries, one owned by Chidester, who testified in the 
case, and one identified by Chidester as the Maxwell lease. 
Both these quarries are contiguous to each other and the 
American Aggregate quarry. The Maxwell quarry lies 
just over the fence from Appellant's quarry. Not only 
was this Park Valley quartz available, the undisputed 
evidence is that Respondent had entered into an agree-
ment with Chidester for the purchase of Park Valley 
quartz prior to the date it entered into the agreement 
with Appellant. The evidence from Chidester relating 
to these facts is as follows: 
Q. "Now, we have in evidence an 
exhibit which is identified as Exhibit 3-P which 
is represented to be a piece of quartz coming from 
Style Crete quarry." (The question was cor-
rected to identify the American Aggregate 
quarry). 
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Q. "You had a chance to observe 
that particular quartzite?" ^ : 
A. "Yes, I have." 
Q. "Is that quartzite similar to the 
quartzite that you have in your quarry?" 
r\. JLOS. • • • 
Mr. Ashton: "Is the quartzite which is in 
your quarry similar both as to quality and color 
to the quartzite which is identified as Exhibit 
3-P?" 
A. "It is identical. Also identical with 
the quartzite that is located in Mr. Maxwell's 
lease, which is immediately contiguous to the 
quartzite that you have" (T. 93-94). 
Next it is suggested that Chidester could not supply 
the quartz because his quarry was not opened up (Appel-
lant's Brief, page 6). Chidester testified that he had the 
option of supplying the material from either the Maxwell 
lease or from his own lease, both of which contained ma-
terial which is identical in color and quality with the 
American Aggregate quartz and which was located in the 
same geological formation. Not only had Chidester negot-
iated with Maxwell to take rock from his pit if he needed 
to do so; he had agreed with Bingle Construction Com-
pany to quarry the material, with Schocker Construction 
Co. to crush it and with Savage Brothers to do the haul-
ing (T. 102). Exhibit 15-D is the agreement which Chid-
ester signed with the Buehner Co. prior to the time Re-
spondents entered into the agreement (Ex. 19-P). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Next Appellant suggests that the Chidester agree-
ment was a sham and a fraud becouse it was cancelled 
shortly after Brimhall signed Exhibit 19-P (T. 103A). 
(This Exhibit is also identified in Defendants Exhibit 5. 
This fact should be kept in mind to avoid confusion. It 
is referred to herein only as 19-P.) 
The evidence on this point is clear and undisputed. 
It shows that between two and four days after Chidester 
signed his agreement he had a telephone call from Mr. 
Buehner in which Buehner indicated that he felt that 
he should get the material from Appellant. He said, "I 
am very sorry. We'll pay." (Meaning expenses that 
Chidester had incurred.) "I know that you have gone 
to a lot of expense to run the details down." . . . "well 
be happy to reimburse you for your expenses, but we 
would like to get out of the purchase order." Chidester 
then testified that "I conceded to let him out of his pur-
chase" (T. 104, 105). This evidence supports Respon-
dents' contention that Respondents relied on their agree-
ment with Appellant prior to cancelling the contract with 
Chidester. Appellant's reckless assertion that this Chid-
ester contract was a fraud and a sham could only have 
been on the theory that Chidester and Buehner lied. 
There is absolutely no reason for reaching such a conclu-
sion. Judge Hall saw the witnesses and judged their 
credibility. 
In dealing with the evidence relating to the critical 
question of agency Appellant refers to several conversa-
tion which occurred between Brimhall and Reimann. From 
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these selected conversations it would appear that Appel-
lant had no knowledge that Brimhall had entered into 
the agreement identified as 19-P. This, of course, is to 
support Appellant's argument that Brimhall had no au-
thority. The very important omitted conversations do 
not support this conclusion. They are contrary to it. The 
omitted conversations are as follows: 
MR. BRIMHALL 
Q. "When you talked to Mr. Buehner, now, 
at the time that you saw Mr. Buehner and you 
started some negotiating with him, did you keep ^ 
the Reimanns (American Aggregate) advised as 
to what you were doing?" 
A. "Yes . . . I worked between them." 
Q. "And did you talk to the Reimanns and 
tell them that you were negotiating this particu-
lar sale of this particular aggregate." 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Did you tell them about your conver-
sation with Mr. Buehner?" 
A. "Yes." (This conversation related to 
price.) 
Q. "Now, when you signed the purchase 
order, which is identified as Exhibit 19-P, did 
you advise the Reimanns that you had signed 
that purchase order?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And did you tell them that you had 
agreed upon a price of $20.50?" 
A. "Yes." 
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Q "Now, after you had., told then* that you •. -
had signed this purchase order for $20.50 did you 
then have a conversation with them about haul-
ing this particular material?" 
A. I went down to Style Crete and met 1J< in 
and Rich and talked to them about it. Fold 
them what I had done and I asked them — told 
them that a certain tonnage had to be delivered 
on a limited time. Winter was approaching and 
I felt there needed to be additional help " 
Q. "And when you told them what you had 
done, did you tell them that you had agreed to 
deliver the -amount of tonnage at the price of 
$20.50 as shown by Exhibit P-19? " - ••- • -
A "Yes." .. './ , • : '' ..' 
Q. "Now1,, how soon alter y ou told them 
about this document that was signed (indicating 
conversations relative to hauling the material to 
the Buehner plant), 
A "With them." 
Q. " I! i ss ' ':'"' . V . . V V- ':..•,/'''''';,•,....,. 
• • A " A t t h a i • tiiiii s, • ':'" 
Q "N o"w , where was that conversa tionT' 
'•' A , !11 • was out at 'the S. C planl ," 
Q. "And who was present besides your-
si ;lf?"' 
A "D >nam 1 Ri* i l l teimann • ( I1 252-253). 
At the time of that conversation, according to Mr. 
Biiiiihall, Don Reimann suggested that Brimhall secure 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
bids for hauling the aggregate which was the subject of 
the agreement identified in P-19. 
The following testimony relates to a conversation 
which occurred prior to the time the contract identified 
as Exhibit P-19 was signed was between Paul Buehner 
and Don Reimann. 
A. "I told Mr. Don Reimann that we had a 
purchase order with Mr. Chidester and that if 
we were going to change it we had to know im-
mediately because Mr. Chidester had to get the 
aggregate out, and if he was — if he were going 
to negotiate with him on the price of $20.50 they 
had to know now. He said he didn't want to do 
it and I said, can I work it out with Mr. Brim-
hall and he said yes, you go ahead . . . " 
Q. "Now, did you have a conversation about 
that time with Mr. Brimhall with reference to his 
authority to act in this matter?" 
A. "Yes." . . . (foundation material omit-
ted). I told Mr. Brimhall that we had a purchase 
order with Mr. Chidester to furnish the rock. 
He, in turn, said, I have the rock crushed on the 
mountain; we have had it there for three or four 
years and I want to get rid of it. Would you 
consider letting us furnish the rock for you and 
he said yes. As a matter of fact, we will give you 
a little bit more per ton because when you've got 
it crushed and we may run into winter problems; 
he said, we'll furnish it for that price." . . . 
A. "Told me that he had an agreement 
with the Reimanns to crush and process the rock 
for sale; that they had a joint venture of some 
kind — I don't know the detail of it, but he had 
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authority to act in the selling of this aggregate. 
He had the big, vested interest in the aggregate 
and he had authority to sell it" (T. 553, 554, 555). 
Appellant not only omits BrimhalTs testimony that 
he advised Reimann of his agreement with Buehner (T. 
252), it also omits any mention of the evidence relating 
to the court's finding that Appellant "ratified and ac-
cepted the purchase agreement." This evidence, like the 
other omission, is of the utmost importance and consisted 
of the following: 
First, immediately after the purchase order had been 
signed and after Appellant had been advised of that fact, 
Appellant started hauling aggregate to the Buehner plant 
in Salt Lake City (T. 419-420). By January of 1970 over 
1300 tons had been delivered. On January 9, D. W. Brim-
hall Company sent a statement to Buehners for 1,302.94 
tons of Park Valley white quartz at $20.50 a ton. This 
amounted to $26,710.27 (Ex. 49-P). 
Not only did Appellant ship all that had been ordered 
— it overshipped so that Respondents received more than 
one thousand tons in excess of their requirements. There 
is evidence in the record that Appellants did nothing to 
prevent this overhaul; in fact they encouraged it. Mr. 
Carlos Frank testified that late in 1970 a person identify-
ing himself as Reimann called on the phone. 
Q. "Did that person at that time tell you 
not to deliver anymore?" 
A. "No." 
i 
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Q. "Did he tell you to go on and continue 
delivering?" 
A. "Yes, and to make sure to have the bills 
signed." 
Q. "All right, and that was toward the lat-
ter part of the haul." 
A. "Yes" (T. 194). 
The testimony of the witness Christensen was even 
more conclusive on this point and is as follows: 
A. "Yes. Don Reimann was in my office on 
many occasions." 
* # * * 
Q. "Did he on the contrary tell you don't 
haul rock to the Buehner Block Company?" 
A. "He told me to keep hauling and get it 
hauled. They wanted to get settled and get their 
money." 
Q. "Did he tell you that in the fall of 
1969?" 
A. "In mid-summer, 1970." 
• * * * 
Q. "And did he tell you that as long as 
you continued to haul, to your knowledge, to 
continue hauling?" 
A. "He told me to keep hauling to get the 
rock hauled." 
Q. "And did you keep hauling until you got 
a stop order from down at the Buehner Block?" 
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A. "We kept hauling rock into Buehner 
Block until Mr. Allred said that was all the rock 
they wanted." 
Q. "And during any of that period of time 
when you were making that hauling, did Mr. Don 
Reimann in any of the frequent visits that he 
had in your area ever tell you to quit hauling?" 
A. "No, sir" (T. 78-79). 
Long before this, on July 9, 1970, Richard Reimann 
entered into an agreement with Brimhall wherein Brim-
hall would take $2.75 less a ton for his crushing charges 
based upon a price of $20.50 per ton. 
Q. "You finally, the two or three of you 
got together, outside of the presence of my client, 
Mr. Buehner, and decided that if the price was 
$20.50 a ton he was going to get $2.75 taken off 
of his $10 haulage fee?" 
The Court: "$10 crushing fee." 
The Witness: "Off his crushing fee." 
Mr. Ashton: "Yes, Your Honor, I am sorry." 
The Court: "All right." 
Mr. Ashton: Q. "$10 crushing fee and 
screening fee or whatever he did?" 
A. "That's right." 
Q. "Was that agreed upon?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Was that agreed upon upon the basis 
that the price was $20.50 a ton?" 
A. "And 4,000 tons, yes" (T. 532). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT BRIM-
HALL WAS A "JOINT VENTURER" WITH 
APPELLANT AND AS SUCH WAS AUTHOR-
IZED TO ACT AS AN AGENT FOR APPEL-
LANT IN ENTERING INTO THE PUR-
CHASE ORDER AGREEMENT FOR THE 
SALE OF AMERICAN AGGREGATE QUART-
ZITE. 
We believe that the evidence fully supports the court 
in making this finding. We have included the evidence 
relating to this point in our Statement of the Facts, par-
ticularly that evidence which is quoted directly from the 
record. We will refer briefly to it here. 
Buehner, before the agreement was signed, talked 
with Don Reimann albout purchasing the rock he needed 
from Chidester. Reimann told him to deal with Brimhall, 
work it out with Brimhall (T. 553). Brimhall said he 
was authorized to act as an agent, and that he kept the 
Reimanns advised of his negotiations (T. 252). Even the 
Reimanns acknowledge that they knew Brimhall was 
negotiating with Beuhner. They never advised Buehner 
that Brimhall was not authorized, instead, on "the eve" 
of signing the purchase order, and knowing that Chidester 
was willing to sell at less than $20.50 per ton told Buehner 
to work it out with Brimhall. 
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By advising Respondents to work it out with Brim-
hall, Appellant bound itself even if Brimhall exceeded 
his authority. It is so stated in the Restatement of the 
Law, American Law Institute, Agency 2d, § 169 at page 
396, as follows: 
A disclosed or partially disclosed principal who 
invites third persons to deal with the agent on 
terms to be disclosed by the agent is subject to 
liability upon contracts made with them by the 
agent, although the terms are not within the 
authority of the agent, unless they have notice 
that the terms are not authorized. 
Comment: 
a. A principal who invites another to rely 
upon the agent's statement as to the extent of 
his authority is bound by the statement, although 
false, as if made by himself, provided the other 
has no reason to know it is false. 
b. Whether or not the principal has mani-
fested that an agent is authorized to disclose the 
terms upon which he is to act is determined by 
the reasonable interpretation of the principal's 
manifestation to the other party. 
Certainly, Respondents, who had just completed a 
telephone conversation with Reimann relative to a pur-
chase from Chidester at less than $20.50, could assume 
that Brimhall had authority to meet that price when he 
was told to work it out with Brimhall. 
Appellant attempts to avoid the agency of Brimhall 
by arguing in their Point I that Brimhall was not a joint 
venturer with American Aggregate. On this point, as 
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others, appellant omits the significant evidence which 
supports the court's finding. Mr. Brimhall testified con-
cerning an agreement he had with the Reimanns. It was 
even reduced to writing and while not signed, expressed 
what had been agreed upon. His testimony is as follows: 
Q. "When did you finally get a point of 
agreement so far as this proposition is concerned 
— the year approximately?" 
A. "Couldn't date it exactly, '65, '66, '67, 
somewhere along in there." 
Q. "I see. So it occurred over a period of 
time; and did you finally reach an agreement 
with the people at American Aggregate then to 
move on to their property and to crush aggregate 
there?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Prior to moving on to that property, 
was there any discussion as to a written agree-
ment setting forth the terms of your arrange-
ments between you and them?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Was this written agreement prepared 
by them, or was it prepared by you?" 
A. "Jointly." 
Q. "Who actually did the typing or the 
final drafting of it, do you remember?" 
A. "Mr. Paul Reimann." 
Q. "And did you receive a copy of this —" 
A. "Yes; 
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Q. "— agreement? Do you have a copy of 
it available now?" 
A. "I am sure I have it, but I can't locate 
it." 
Q. "You have made a diligent search for 
it?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Was this ever signed — did you ever 
sign it?" 
A. "No." 
Q. "Did it set forth generally the terms of 
your agreement?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Dd you recall the terms of that agree-
ment?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Will you explain to the Court some of 
the essential elements of that agreement?" . . . 
A. "We had talked about an approximate 
5,000 tons stockpile which would be a reasonable 
quantity to consider and to have material ready 
available for any market that might come along; 
and we determined the sizes at that time but of 
course I was talking to Buehner — Otto Buehner 
Company and Rocky Mountain Aggregate from 
Golden, Colorado, and Reimanns." 
Q. "So you determined the sizes and then 
you — what responsibility did you have then 
to accumulating the stockpile, were you to crush 
the material?" 
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A. "I was to quarry it, crush it, and stock-
pile it in these various sizes." 
Q. "Now, what other responsibility did you 
have with regard to this agreement; who was go-
ing to sell the product, who was going to deliver 
it and so forth." 
A. "I understood we each had that respon-
sibility to try to secure sales for it and that we 
were all agents for it and —" 
Q. "Did you plan on doing the hauling of 
the material?" 
A. "No. This was Reimann's responsibility. 
Mine was strictly the quarrying and crushing 
and—" 
Q. "Did your agreement make any provi-
sion for any specific payments for one phase of 
the operation as adverse to another; for instance, 
were you to be paid for the crushing or were 
they to be paid for the hauling, as adverse to —" 
A. "We were each to be repaid for the re-
spective job that we did." 
Q. "All right. And how much were you to 
be paid for the crushing?" 
A. "$10 a ton." 
Q. "And how much were they to be paid 
for the hauling?" 
A. "$8—" 
Q. "Was a royalty discussed at that time?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "How much were you informed the roy-
alty on the product was?" 
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A. "$1.50." 
Q. "And who was to pay the royalty?" 
A. "It was to be paid out of the — overall 
funds our price per ton." 
Q. "Was there some provision for a division 
of profit in the enterprise?" 
A. "Yes" (T. 568-571). 
Prior to giving this testimony Mr. Brimhall had been 
called as an adverse witness by counsel for appellant. He 
was examined by Mr. Reimann on this same subject 
matter as follows: 
Q. "Didn't you state that American Ag-
gregate Corporation would have to do with the 
selling?" 
A. "I said that this was a joint venture." 
Q. "Well, you told me that on that occa-
sion —" 
A. "You knew this." 
Q. "How did I know it?" 
A. "Because you drafted the agreement." 
Q. "There was no agreement ever signed, 
was there?" 
A. "The draft — the agreement was drafted 
and each of us were sent a copy." 
Q. "You took all the copies away, didn't 
you?" 
A. "No. I didn't. You mailed my copy to 
me by mail. I received it from the post office in 
my mail box" (T. 212-213). 
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Mr. Reimann then changed the subject and did not 
return to it again. On cross examination, however, on the 
same subject matter, Respondent elicited from Mr. Brim-
hall the following: 
MR. ASHTON: 
Q. "As I understand, you said that the 
agreement was, which has been written up and 
a copy sent to you, was that you would receive 
$10 per ton when it was sold and they would 
receive $8. Is that right — $8.00?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And then the royalty would be paid?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And then you would share in whatever 
was left and split the profit, if any, is that right?" 
A. "Right." 
Q. "And that was the agreement which was 
written up; and did you understand that to be 
the agreement between you?" 
A. "Yes." 
MR. REIMANN: 
" Just a moment. I object to that. They have 
said the agreement was not signed so it's incom-
petent, irrelevant and immaterial. There was 
no such document ever signed." 
MR. ASHTON: 
Q. "Had they agreed with you to those 
terms, regardless of whether the document was 
signed?" 
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MR. REIMANN: 
"Just a moment. We object to that. The 
witness has already testified that he sold his in-
terest in this and was getting $10 per ton. And 
he stated what all he had to do to get it." 
THE COURT: 
"And the profit after that, is that what he 
said?" 
MR. REIMANN: 
"His deposition is —" 
THE COURT: 
"His testimony here today was that he was 
going to share in some profits" (T. 250-251). 
The omitted evidence thus clearly supports the court's 
finding that the Reimanns and Brimhall were acting for 
each other in a joint enterprise and that BrimhalTs acts 
were not only authorized but were ratified and approved 
by the Reimanns. Disregarding this evidence, Appellant 
launches into an involved legal argument with supporting 
cases and statutes asserting that as a matter of law there 
was not a joint enterprise. We submit that these statutes 
and cases have no application to the facts in this case as 
there was an agreement to share profits and as the Stilwell 
case relied upon by Appellant holds, (Stilwell v. Trutan-
ich, 3 Cal. Rptr. 285, 178 C. A. 2d 614; "The law implies 
a provision that losses are to be shared among the parties 
in the same proportion as profits were to have been di-
vided." 
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Appellant cites Section 48-1-3, U. C. A., 1953, as a 
definition of joint venture. That section defines a part-
nership. Whether a joint venture is the same as a part-
nership or not need not be argued. Both parties were 
co-owners of the crushed rock, both having an interest 
by reason of a quarry ownership and a crushing operation 
and by reason of their agreement to share the profits of 
the sale of the crushed material. The fact that they were 
not joint owners in the quarry is immaterial. 
This Court in at least two cases, Bates v. Simpson, 
121 U. 165, 239 P. 2d 749, and Shutte & Sons v. Broad-
bent, 24 U. 2d 415, 473 P. 2d 885, has defined a joint ven-
ture. In the Shutte case the Court cited the Bates case 
with approval and then quoted from Realty Development 
Co. v. Felt, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P. 2d 898, concerning the 
requirements for a joint venture, as follows: 
1. "There must be a joint interest in the 
property." 
2. "There must be agreements, express or 
implied, to share in the profits or losses of the 
venture." 
3. "There must be actions and conduct 
showing cooperation in the project." 
There is evidence in this case supporting all three re-
quirements. That evidence is referred to herein. The fact 
that this evidence is ignored by Appellant does not mean 
that the trial court did so. 
Appellant has misinterpreted 48-1-6, U. C. A., 1953, 
and has omitted to point out as provided therein that: 
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Every partner is an agent of the partnership for 
the purpose of its business, and the act of every 
partner, including the execution in the part-
nership name of any instrument for apparently 
carrying on in the usual way the business of the 
partnership of which he is a member, binds the 
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in 
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the 
particular matter and the person with whom he 
is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has 
no such authority. 
Next, Appellant on page 23 of its brief, ignoring the 
evidence, writes: 
There was no joint venture because Brimhall 
was to receive a fixed price of $10 a ton when 
the aggregate was sold and plaintiff collected 
the money, and he was not to share any loss with 
plaintiff. Consequently, there was no agency. 
However, if there had been a joint venture, the 
purchase order would have had to be signed in 
the name of the joint venture in order to bind 
plaintiff, not in the name of Brimhall alone. 
The fact that American Aggregate's name was not 
on the Purchase Order was argued to the court below. 
There, as here, the court was referred to, see 149, Ameri-
can Law Institute Restatement of the Law Second, page 
365, wherein it is written: 
A disclosed or partially disclosed principal is 
subject to liability upon an authorized contract 
in writing, if not negotiable or sealed, although 
it purports to be the contract of the agent, un-
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less the principal is excluded as a party by the 
terms of the instrument or by the agreement 
of the parties. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF RATIFIED THE PURCHASE ORDER 
AGREEMENT. 
Evidence has been referred to in Respondents' State-
ment of the Facts, particularly in quotations from the 
record indicating evidence which the court relied on to 
prove a ratification. On the 29th of May, 1970, long after 
the Purchase Order had been signed, Mr. Buehner had 
a conversation with Mr. Don Reimann. Buehner testi-
fied, after refreshing his recollection from a diary which 
he kept regularly at that time. His testimony from that 
diary was as follows: 
Q. "Now, will you tell the Court after re-
freshing your recollection which you have al-
ready done, what he said in that conversation 
and what was said by you." 
A. "He said in that conversation — he said 
he would like to meet to settle the price on the 
aggregate." 
Q. "And was this after the meeting of 
course of April or May of 1970?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And what, if anything, did you say?" 
A. "Glad to meet." 
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Q. "And did you ever meet with him after 
that t imer 
A. "Had another phone call." 
Q. "Now, have you told us all that trans-
pired in that particular phone call?" 
A. "That's all I had reference to in the 
diary." 
Q. "Did you have another phone call, look-
ing at your diary on June the 3rd of 1970?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And was it made at the time?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And of course it's in your handwrit-
ing?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Now, after having refreshed your rec-
ollection of that conversation, will you tell the 
Court who that conversation was with?" 
A. "Was with Don Reimann." 
Q. "And were you looking at the same 
place where the conversation occurred by tele-
phone?" 
A. "By telephone." 
Q. "At your office?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Now, will you tell the Court in your 
own words what was said by you and what was 
said by Mr. Reimann — Don Reimann?" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
A. "He called and said we would accept the 
price on the aggregate which has been discussed, 
which was $20.50. And he also said that he would 
like to have us help him with the use of our mod-
els and molds on the oxen at the reduced price." 
* * * * 
A. "And we — I agreed to reduce the price 
for the use of the oxen and the molds — that is 
the molds and the models at that time; and we 
came to the agreement then that he would have 
those at the reduced price and we agreed on the 
price for the aggregate." 
Q. "Now, did you subsequently produce 
those oxen — the molds for the oxen." 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And did he use them?" 
A. "Yes." 
* * * * 
Q. "Now, all right. Did you ever hear any 
more about the aggregate price until the lawsuit 
was filed against you?" 
A. "No" (T. 557-559). 
Appellant not only argues contrary to the evidence, 
as pointed out herein that there was a ratification, he 
also argues that such ratification by his clients was illegal 
because it violated the "Unfair Practices Act" and that 
the sale was below Appellant's costs and, therefore, illegal. 
Without arguing the cost question, which indeed is sub 
ject to argument (Appellant did not take into considera-
tion the profit made by itself and Brimhall from crushing 
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and hauling), we submit that Appellant has no standing 
in this case to apply the statute. The court found that 
the agreement providing for the sale of aggregate was not 
only authorized by Appellant but that Appellant also 
ratified Brimhall's acts. From these findings it follows, 
even though Appellant refuses to accept the conclusion, 
that Appellant was a seller and not a buyer or a third 
party competitor. As seller, it is not seeking to recover 
on a contract; as prohibited by the act it is attempting 
to avoid its own contract. The contract, as found by the 
court, is not a secret one between Brimhall and Respon-
dents, it is an authorized and ratified contract between 
Appellant and Brimhall and Respondents. 
The effect of what Appellant is trying to do is to 
convince this court that a seller can enter into a contract 
below cost and after delivering the full amount of the 
product, repudiate its agreement and recover on the 
theory that its violation of the law excuses its perform-
ance. The "below cost" provision of the "Unfair Practices 
Act" is not to protect sellers who enter into an agreement 
to sell below cost, but to protect the public and competi-
tors who are damaged thereby. 
While Respondents have urged that this statute is 
not applicable to a seller who seeks to repudiate his own 
contract, there is still a further reason why the statute 
is not applicable. Counsel's point is made in a recent 
case, Pacific Engineering and Production Company v. 
Kerr-McGee, et al.} decided by Judge Hoffman sitting 
as a United States District Judge in Salt Lake City in 
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February of this year. The case is not yet printed but 
will be by the time this case is argued. While we ap-
preciate that this is not an appellate court decision, it is 
well-reasoned and refers to cases which have been de-
termined and to authorities which have considered the 
question. It is, therefore, quoted at some length as fol-
lows: 
"PE's final claim is that a number of AMPOT's 
sales below cost were in violation of Section 13-
5-7 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. The perti-
nent part of this section reads as follows: 
"It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer 
to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by re-
tailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined 
in this act with the intent and purpose of induc-
ing the purchase of other merchandise or of un-
fairly diverting trade from a competitor or other-
wise injuring a competitor, impairs and prevents 
fair competition, injures public welfare, is unfair 
competition contrary to public policy and the 
policy of this act and is declared to be a violation 
of this act." 
"Even assuming that Kerr-McGee Chemical Cor-
poration offered or sold its A/P below cost within 
the State of Utah, we feel that the Utah statute 
is clearly inapplicable. There are many reasons 
for our belief; however, our discussion will focus 
only on the fact that the statute applies to re-
tailers and wholesalers and not to manufactur-
ers." 
"Although PE has tried to persuade us that the 
Utah legislature intended the word wholesalers 
to be given a broad interpretation, we are con-
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•**>•:.. vinced otherwise. In Burt v. Woolsulate, 106 
Utah 156, 146 P. 2d 203, 205, the Utah Supreme 
Court discussed the reasons for the enactment 
of the various unfair practices acts. The court 
stated that 'the immediate stimuli for the enact-
ment of such acts were in part the rapid rise of 
chain stores and in part the general sharpening 
of competitive pratiees under pressure of the de-
pression.' 
Quoting from an article entitled Trohibiting 
Price Discrimination and Sales Below Cost: The 
State Unfair Practices Acts,' which appeared in 
32 111. Law Rev. 816, the court stated: 
"One of the practices aimed at by these (unfair 
practices acts) statutes is that, common in chain 
stores, of selling at lower prices in one locality 
than in another and making up losses incurred 
by profits in other stores. Even more important 
in the application of anti-discrimination statutes 
today is the prevention of discrimination sales by 
manufacturers to customers with unusually 
strong bargaining power who can force large price 
concessions. * * * 
"On the whole the anti-discrimination provisions 
of the Unfair Practices Acts seem best fitted to 
reach manufacturers and producers who, in the 
past have placed certain retail buyers in pre-
ferred competitive positions by giving them spe-
cial rebates or other price favors. Enforcement 
at this point can be doubly effective under the 
'Little Robinson-Patman Acts' which penalize 
not only the seller but the buyer who knowingly 
induces or receives discrimination in price." 
Although the word "manufacturers" is used, it is 
clear that the purpose of the act was to protect the small 
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independent merchant. It is equally clear that the below 
cost provision should not be applied to manufacturers. 
This latter point is set forth in the law review article 
mentioned above. 
In this article, the following is stated: 
"While the wording of the sales below cost pro-
visions in most of the statutes is broad enough in 
scope to include those engaged in business in all 
its various phases, the types of businesses to 
which laws of this sort can be successfully ap-
plied are necessarily limited. The acts are in-
adequate for application to manufacturer's sales 
because of the complex factors involved in de-
termining cost." 
The article further states: 
"A few of the acts do not extend the sales below 
cost provisions to manufacturers. In view of 
the fact that the most undesirable practices of 
manufacturers are eliminated by the anti-dis-
crimination sections, it seems proper that they 
should be exempt from the sales below cost pro-
visions." 
The product which was involved in the Kerr-McGee 
case was manufactured at ThiokoPs plant in Utah. The 
product involved in the instant case was quarried and 
crushed, in other words, manufactured in Utah. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN FINDING THAT AP-
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PELLANT WAS NOT TO BE PAID MORE 
THAN $20.50 PER TON FOR ALL THE AG-
GREGATE DELIVERED. 
Appellant's argument is as follows: 
Plaintiff never executed the fraudulent and illegal 
Brimhall Purchase Order." But instead, "that it would 
refrain from suing if defendants complied with four speci-
fied conditions; but defendants never complied with any 
of them." Appellant thus goes from one erroneous as-
sumption to another which grows to monstrous propor-
tions and which becomes difficult to answer simply be-
cause it is based upon false premises. 
First, the court found that Appellant did execute the 
contract through its agent and that it did ratify the con-
tract by shipping the aggregate and receiving payment. 
Respondents always stood on that contract (T. 555-556) 
and the court found that that contract was executed and 
ratified. The contract provided for 4000 tons and, in 
addition, that in the event additional material is needed 
"it will be provided at the same price." Exhibit P-19. 
Not only was additional material supplied, it was, 
as indicated herein, over-supplied, because Don Reimann 
told Christensen "to keep hauling and get it hauled. They 
wanted to get settled and get their money" (T. 78-79). 
Because of this over-haul, Respondents received approxi-
mately 1000 tons more than they wanted. Rather than 
dispute with Appellant on this matter they conceded at 
the close of the evidence they would pay for the over-de-
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livered amount and tendered into the court the sum due 
and owing as though they had ordered the same. It seems 
strange that Appellant would complain of this over-de-
livery which was caused! by its own enthusiasm. The court 
may not have been unmindful of the fact that at the time 
the agreement was entered into it was estimated that 
there were approximately 5000 tons of crushed material 
which neither Appellant nor Brimhall had been able to 
sell for three or four years. The sale in this case disposed 
of that entire amount. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Respondents respect-
fully submit that the Court should sustain the findings 
and judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By 
Clifford L. Ashton 
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